January 31, 2026
Aircraft Certification Generally
Aircraft certification in the United States is managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and grounded in technical compliance with established safety standards. The approach to aircraft certification between the FAA and Transport Canada is largely the same, save for a few parts of the certification process where Transport Canada adopts the European approach to aircraft certification. It is important to pause and recognize that all national aviation authorities (NAA), including the FAA and Transport Canada, believe that their approach to aircraft certification provides the highest level of safety assurance before a large piece of metal and complex aircraft systems are approved for carrying passengers into and out of civilian airports.
When a NAA certifies an aircraft, they issue what is commonly referred to as a ‘type certificate’. In Canada, this is done when Transport Canada publishes a type certificate data sheet. Manufacturers can apply to other NAAs with the type certificate in hand, to obtain validation of the type-certificated aircraft. Some NAAs have bilateral agreements among them to administer these kinds of certifications, and will seek clarifications or additional data points from either the home country authority or the manufacturer on issues observed in the submitted application, based on the NAA’s standard practice.
When a manufacturer knows that the aircraft they are working on is going to, or already has broad transborder or international adoption plans, the NAAs can at the outset strike a joint aircraft certification working group, which streamlines the issues of the type certificate across various authorities. The baseline for aircraft certification is a minimum of 5 years when an NAA is reviewing a clean-sheet design, ie. a design from the ground up, and not a modification of an existing aircraft design that has been approved.
Given the intense process required for certification, NAAs will not simply approve a type certificate when it is issued by another NAA. Instead, they will begin this process on application by a manufacturer, and on the basis that the aircraft type in question has demand in the country, typically by way of an agreement for purchase by an operator planning to operate the aircraft type in the country in question.
US Administration Comments on January 29 and January 30, 2026
Recent comments by U.S. President Donald Trump have once again thrust the aerospace sector at the center of transborder trade tensions. In remarks that quickly reverberated through the aviation industry, President Trump threatened to impose a 50% tariff on Canadian aircraft and suggested that his administration could move to “decertify” Canadian-manufactured aircraft, singling out Bombardier by name.
The comments were framed as retaliation for Canada’s alleged refusal to certify several Gulfstream aircraft models, including the G500, G600, G700, and G800. According to the President, this refusal justified decertifying Bombardier Global Express aircraft, and potentially all aircraft manufactured in Canada, until Gulfstream received certification.
While the White House later clarified that aircraft already in operation would not be affected, the episode underscores how headline-grabbing threats can raise serious questions about the integrity of aircraft certification, and the real-world consequences for aircraft operators and passengers around the world.
Certification as a Regulatory Function – Not a Trade Lever
It is unclear whether the President has the legal authority, without an act of Congress, to direct the FAA to revoke or alter certifications for reasons unrelated to safety, such as trade policy or political considerations. What is clear is that any such intervention would raise concerns about the FAA’s regulatory independence and erode confidence in the global framework of bilateral aviation safety agreements, on which international aviation stands. These agreements, including reciprocal certification regimes, are essential to international aviation because they rely on the assumption that certification decisions are made objectively and grounded in technical compliance and safety standards rather than political or economic pressures.
Is Decertification irrevocable under International civil aviation Law?
International civil aviation law, as laid down in the 1944 Chicago Convention and ICAO Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft, to which both US and Canada are parties, does not contemplate or permit the arbitrary revocation of an aircraft’s certification. A State may suspend or revoke certification only on recognized grounds, such as technical non-compliance with applicable airworthiness requirements, the existence of unsafe conditions affecting the aircraft, failure to maintain continuing airworthiness, or the provision of false or incomplete information in obtaining certification. Political considerations do not fall within these recognized grounds. The very purpose of these international rules is to promote common standards, predictability, and reciprocity in an industry that is inherently global in nature.
Beyond international obligations, domestic administrative law principles also constrain the actions of aviation authorities such as the FAA. As an administrative body, the FAA is bound by principles of reasonableness, procedural fairness, non-arbitrariness, and the right to notice and an opportunity to respond. These principles would preclude compliance with statements or directives lacking a lawful and technically justified basis, including those motivated by political considerations.
Regional Airlines Would Bear the Brunt
If certification for Canadian-manufactured aircraft were withdrawn, the impact on U.S. regional aviation would be immediate and severe. Bombardier CRJ aircraft (a type certificate which is now owned by Mitsubishi industries) are a cornerstone of regional operations, with 648 passenger CRJ jets in active service across U.S. airlines. These planes operate more than 2,600 flights daily, providing roughly 175,000 seats each day, according to Cirium, an aviation analytics company.
Of the major legacy carriers, in February 2026 alone it is estimated that:
- American Airlines will operate over 28,000 regional flights using Bombardier CRJ700 and CRJ900 aircraft, offering nearly two million seats.
- Nearly 27,000 of Delta Air Lines flights will be operated on Bombardier jets, again providing roughly two million seats to passengers.
- United Airlines will offer about one million seats across 19,648 flights.
Any disruption to these aircraft would ripple through airline networks, affecting schedules, capacity, and the millions of passengers who rely on these essential feeder services.
Beyond Bombardier: Collateral Consequences
Bombardier is not the only Canadian aerospace manufacturer potentially affected. De Havilland Canada, whose water-bombing aircraft are among the world’s most effective wildfire-fighting tools, could also be impacted. These planes have played critical roles in responding to major disasters, including the 2025 Los Angeles firestorm.
Canadian carriers would also feel the effects. In February 2026, Air Canada scheduled more than 2,500 U.S. flights using Canadian-manufactured aircraft, representing nearly 200,000 seats. Any disruption would ripple through cross-border travel, likely leading to reduced service and higher fares.
Is Canada Unfairly Targeting Gulfstream and Delaying Certification?
While Transport Canada is not winning any awards for speed of implementation, their processes are on par with that of other NAAs. Prospective Canadian aircraft buyers can elect to purchase a Gulfstream product, including those which are not yet validated by Transport Canada, by registering the aircraft under a US Non-citizen trust structure. A US-registered Gulfstream aircraft can operate privately in Canada without any operational limitations, and this period would also provide the basis and impetus for Transport Canada to certify the aircraft following their standard processes.
Therefore, there is no logical basis for how aircraft certification would sway purchase behaviour. Instead, factors such as service centres and spare parts availability are likely to impact the purchase decision of a Canadian, looking to buy a business jet. Business jets break down and require replacement parts and service far more often than the average person might expect. Given that their function is to move business leaders quickly to places they need to be, the availability of parts and service becomes a critical issue when assessing which business aircraft is best to acquire.
In the President’s comments, he noted that these Gulfstream products are the “most technologically advanced airplanes ever made”. From a regulatory perspective, this brings to mind challenges relating to the 737 Max certification, which were exposed after two fatal accidents involving those aircraft types. When regulators must validate lines of code relating to aircraft function and performance, particularly given the catastrophic events around the 737 Max, they are likely to approach such certification with more rigour. In fact, this is exactly what happened to Gulfstream, which faced added FAA scrutiny during the certification process for each of these aircraft types. If Transport Canada is approaching the certification of these aircraft types methodically, it is likely the level of technological advancement that is the cause of the delays in certification.
Anecdotally, we are not even aware of any customers that have Gulfstream manufactured aircraft in their possession or on order, and which are being impacted by the certification process. This likely underscores the fact that Transport Canada may not have even commenced aircraft certification, on the basis that there is no requirement to do so.
Aviation Depends on Independent, Safety-Driven Oversight
While it is important for industry participants to separate political threats from regulatory realities, this episode highlights a fundamental truth: the aviation industry relies on objective, safety-driven oversight, which must remain insulated from political or economic pressure. The integrity of global air travel depends on this careful separation, ensuring that every certification and safety decision is made solely on technical compliance and rigorous safety standards.